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ABSTRACT This paper presents a novel security architecture for protecting the integrity of iris images
and templates using watermarking and visual cryptography (VC). The proposed scheme offers a complete
protection framework for the iris biometrics which consists of two stages: the first stage is for iris image
protection, while the second is for the iris template. First, for protecting the iris image, a watermark text
which carries personal information is embedded in the middle band frequency region of the iris image using
a novel watermarking algorithm that randomly interchanges multiple middle band pairs of the discrete cosine
transform. Second, for iris template protection, the binary iris template is divided into two shares using VC,
where one share is stored in the database and the other is kept with the user on a smart card. In addition,
the SHA-2 hash function is utilized to maintain the integrity of the stored iris template in both the database
and smart card. The experimental and comparison results on the CASIA V4 and UBIRIS V1 iris databases
demonstrate that the proposed framework preserves the privacy of the iris images and templates and retains
robustness to malicious attacks, while it does not have a discernible effect on the recognition performance.
INDEX TERMS Biometrics, iris recognition, security and privacy protection, watermarking, smart card,
template security, visual cryptography.
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the fact that biometric systems offer reliable
techniques for personal identification, their usage could be
hampered by the lack of a proper protection scheme that
guarantees the security and privacy of the biometric traits.
When biometric images or templates are transmitted through
insecure channels or stored as raw data, they run risks of being
stolen or modified. Hence, it is imperative that robust and
reliable means of biometric protection are implemented [1].
Ratha et al. [2] described eight types of attacks that are
possible in a biometric system, such as database template
tampering, template modification, the matcher override of the
final decision and attack on the channel between the feature
extractor and the matcher, or attack on the channel between
the database andmatcher.Moreover, due to thewide spread of
biometrics technology in many applications, it is very likely
that biometric data are being transmitted over non secure
channels. Hence, for a biometric system to work properly, the
system must guarantee that the biometric data came from a
legitimate person at the time of enrolment.
Several means are employed to protect biometric data such
as only encryption, or watermarking and encryption. Encryp-
tion can be used as one potential mechanism for protecting
the biometric features as in [3]. However, encryption may
limit the capacity of large scale biometric systems because
it can be computationally expensive. In addition, encryption
cannot provide complete protection as the templates must be
decrypted before matching. Jain et al. emphasized this in [4]
by suggesting that if only cryptographic techniques are used
for the protection of biometric data, security of such data is
not fully maintained because this data has to be decrypted
somewhere.
Therefore, the use of watermarking technology has
emerged. Since watermarking involves hiding information
within the host data, it can provide security even after decryp-
tion. On the other hand, Visual Cryptography (VC) can be
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utilized for biometric template protection. The most com-
monly used template for an iris recognition system is the
so called IrisCode which is a binary compact representa-
tion of the iris [5]. This template is usually stored as raw
data in databases or transmitted over unsecured channels.
It was believed in the biometrics community that this type
of iris representation does not reveal adequate information to
regenerate the iris image as the encoding process is a one-
way function. However, recently researchers [6], [7] were
able to propose a reversibility scheme for the IrisCode. For
instance, the authors in [7] proposed a reconstruction method
for iris images from a binary template using a probabilistic
approach based on genetic algorithms where they analyzed
the vulnerabilities of commercial iris recognition systems
by matching the reconstructed synthetic images against the
original ones. Their experiments showed the fragility of such
systems against this type of attack.
Due to the aforementioned points, it is imperative to find
robust template protection methods. In this paper, we there-
fore propose the first work which considers enhancing the
security of the iris biometrics through both watermarking and
VC. The proposed framework for iris biometrics protection
incorporates two stages. The first stage is a robust water-
marking algorithm to protect the evidentiary integrity of the
iris images based on randomly exchanging four middle band
coefficient pairs of the DCT to embed text data as a contex-
tual watermark in the iris image. The second stage is a VC
scheme for iris template protection that neither involves pixel
expansion nor quality loss in the iris template. Therefore, after
decomposing the iris template into two shares, one share is
given to the user on a smart card and the other share is stored
in the database along with a signature generated by a hash
function. Furthermore, the integrity of the stored iris template
is also guaranteed by using the hash signatures.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section
presents a literature review on the related works while
Section III gives an overview of the watermarking algorithms
and visual cryptography. The proposed method is explained
in Section IV. Experimental design and performance analysis
are given in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes this
paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
Various algorithms have been suggested to protect biometric
data using watermarking. Park et al. [8] proposed a water-
marking method to embed the iris feature inside a face
image and tested their method under different attacks.
Hassanien et al. [9] suggested a watermarking technique
based on the Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) to embed
iris data into the content of a digital image in order to identify
the owner. However, no experiments have been undertaken
on the effect of the watermarking on the iris recognition
performance. Later, the authors in [10] applied a biometric
watermarking by taking the DWT and the Singular Value
Decomposition (SVD) of the host image to obtain eigen
vectors. Next, the iris features were extracted with the DCT
to obtain 200 coefficients and then embedded in the eigen
vector derived from the host image. Despite the good results
reported by the authors, the drawback of this approach is
that the feature extraction algorithm for the iris cannot be
changed. The work in [11] applied watermarking to hide the
fingerprint and iris features in a cover image. The cover image
is divided into blocks then each block is transformed with
a two-dimensional DCT and classified as a smooth block
or edge block. The biometric features are embedded in the
low frequency coefficients of the 8 × 8 DCT blocks while
the edge blocks are eliminated. However, removing the edge
blocks could unfortunately result in quality degradation of
the original image. A watermarking algorithm is proposed
in our previous work [12] to protect the iris images based
on interchanging fixed locations of the DCT middle band
coefficients. However, there is a possibility that an attacker
can predict these fixed locations and destroy the watermark
information or embed false watermark data. In addition, the
iris template is still not protected as the aim of that work was
to protect the iris images only.
It is evident from the previous works that watermarking
can be used effectively to protect the integrity of biometric
images. However, watermarking cannot be used for biometric
template protection because watermarking introduces some
degradation to the host medium. In a biometric system,
any degradation to the template is not acceptable because
such degradation is going to affect the system performance
significantly. Therefore, alternative approaches are needed.
Hao et al. [13] presented a scheme for integrating the iris
biometric into cryptographic applications. The iris code
is encoded with binary keys using XOR operation while
Hadamard and Reed-Solomon codes are used to resolve the
variability in the iris code. Good results are reported in term
of False Reject Rate (FRR) however, the iris images were
ideal and according to [14] a high FRR was recorded when
the approach is applied on the ICE database. In addition,
the 44 security bits used in this method is inadequate in the
current cryptographic applications [15]. Cimato et al. [16]
proposed a multi-biometric system which extracts an identi-
fier (ID) from the templates of left and right irises of each
user with the help of a hash function and pseudo random
permutation function. In the verification phase, both the tem-
plates and user’s ID are required to complete the authen-
tication. Although the proposed method can offer a secure
ID generation, we remark that the iris template is still not
protected. In addition, this method requires two biometric
traits to generate the ID which adds more complexity.
More recently, Yan et al. [15] proposed a method to
preserve the privacy of the biometric credential. Their method
fuses the user’s biometrics (iris image) with a reference
subject using keys extracted from the user’s biometrics to
generate a BioCapsul which could be used later instead of
the biometric template for the authentication. However, this
method degrades the iris recognition performance. In addi-
tion, generating the BioCapsul requires more complex oper-
ation compared to the simple VC scheme that we propose
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in this paper. Rathgeb et al. [17] proposed a scheme for iris
template protection based on Bloom filters. Although the
usage of Bloom filters enables irreversibility for a uniform
iris template, the scheme does not provide unlinkability. This
concern is reinforced by the work of Hermans et al. [18]
which demonstrated that the scheme is vulnerable to
cross-matching attacks.
VC is a robust way of protecting an image without
complicated mathematical operations or any knowledge of
cryptography. Although there are some methods for protect-
ing the biometric traits with VC [19], [20], few enhance the
security of iris biometric through VC. The authors in [19]
proposed a method to secure the face image with the help
of stenography and VC to decompose the image into two
shares where each share is stored in a different database so
that the original image can be revealed only when both shares
are available. The drawback with the previous method is the
additional cost of having two database servers for saving the
shares and the possibility of tampering the templates in these
databases. In [20] the authors proposed a method to improve
the privacy of the face images using half-toning and VC to
split the face images into two encrypted parts. However, the
efficiency and robustness of this method were not supported
by experimental results or security analysis. In addition, no
information is given on how to deal with the loss in contrast
or the problem of resolution expansion of the resultant image
in the aforementioned methods.
In this paper, we fill the gap in iris biometrics security by
proposing a two-stage framework for iris images and template
protection. The first stage is a robust watermarking algorithm
to protect the evidentiary integrity of the iris images based on
exchanging multiple middle band coefficients of DCT blocks
using text data as a contextual watermark. The second stage is
protecting the iris template with VC by dividing the template
into two secret shares.
III. WATERMARKING ALGORITHMS AND
VISUAL CRYPTOGRAPHY
As the proposed approach is based on two main schemes,
namely watermarking and visual cryptography, this section
prepares the reader by giving a brief overview of watermark-
ing and visual cryptography algorithms and highlights why
the DCT has been selected as the transform basis of the
proposed watermarking algorithm.
A. WATERMARKING ALGORITHMS
A number of watermarking techniques are available for
embedding information securely in an image. Watermarking
algorithms can be classified according to their embedding
domain into transformation domain techniques [21] and spa-
tial domain techniques [22]. In the spatial domain the pixel
values are directly modified to embed the watermark using
different approaches such as Least Significant Bit (LSB) [23]
or the correlation-based technique [24]. While the spatial
domain techniques have least complexity and high payload,
they cannot withstand low pass filtering, image compression
and common image processing attacks [25]. Therefore, trans-
form domain watermarking has emerged because it is robust
against image manipulations and compression. In the fre-
quency domain, the host image is segmented into multiple
frequency chains using several transformations such as DWT
or DCT [21], [26]. Then, the inverse transform is applied to
obtain the watermarked image.
In principle, any frequency domain transform can be used
for image watermarking, however, frequency transformation
in the DCT domain allows an image to be divided into
different frequency bands, so they facilitate embedding the
watermarking information in a specific frequency band [27].
It has been found that the middle frequency bands are most
suitable for embedding the watermark because the low fre-
quency band carries the most visual important parts of the
image while the high frequency band is exposed to removal
through compression and noise attacks on the image. There-
fore, embedding the watermark in the middle frequency
band neither affects the visual important parts of the image
(low frequency) nor overexposes them to removal through
attacks when high frequency components are targeted [27].
B. VISUAL CRYPTOGRAPHY
VC is a secret sharing scheme which was introduced by
Naor and Shamir [28] to decompose an image into n random
shares such that, when all these shares are superimposed, the
original image is revealed again. However, the secret image
will not be revealed if the number of stacked shares is less
than n.
FIGURE 1. (2,2) visual cryptography; the 50% loss in contrast can be
solved when using the XOR operation.
In the case of (2,2) VC, each pixel in the binary image I
of size (M × N ) is encoded into two subpixels which are
denoted as SR1 and SR2 as illustrated in Fig. 1. If the pixel
is white, one of the two rows in Fig. 1 corresponding to the
white pixel is randomly chosen to generate SR1 and SR2 and
vice versa for a black pixel. Therefore, neither SR1 nor SR2
divulges any information about the binary image I . The orig-
inal image can be reconstructed again by superimposing SR1
and SR2 together. However, the resulting image will be of size
(M × 2N ).
Although traditional VC is a simple and a powerful protec-
tion scheme, unfortunately, it has not been widely used due to
the increase in image size and the 50% loss in contrast [29].
The problem of contrast loss can be solved by superimposing
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the shares together using the XOR operation instead of the
OR (as shown in Fig. 1) and hence no loss in quality will occur
in the original image. Nevertheless, the generated image is
still twice the size of the original one. In the next section we
propose an approach to remedy this problem.
IV. THE PROPOSED METHOD
In this section, we propose a two-layer iris images and
templates protection scheme. The first stage is a robust
watermarking algorithm to protect the iris images based on
randomly exchanging the middle band coefficients of the
DCT blocks using text data as a contextual watermark while
the second stage is focusing on protecting the iris template
with VC.
A. STAGE ONE: IRIS IMAGES WATERMARKING
The proposed watermarking algorithm is designed in a way
which will not degrade the iris image or the recognition
performance while it retains robustness to malicious attacks
and noise. Hence, the proposed algorithm encodes one-bit
of the binary watermark text into each 8 × 8 sub-block of
the host image by ensuring that the difference of two mid-
band coefficients is positive in the case the encoded value
is 1. Otherwise, the twomid-band coefficients are exchanged.
Accordingly, after the DCT is applied to the image,
an 8 × 8 block is taken. Each DCT block consists of three
frequency bands as illustrated in Fig. 2. FL and FH stand
for the low and high frequency components of the block
respectively, while FM is the middle frequency band and is
chosen for embedding watermark information. This avoids
significant modifications to the cover image while providing
additional resistance to lossy compression techniques which
target the high frequency components [30].
FIGURE 2. Frequency regions in an 8× 8 DCT block [27].
The proposed scheme targets the middle frequency
band FM so that two locations from the DCT block (DCTu1,v1
and DCTu2,v2) are chosen as the region for comparison.
Firstly, the watermark text is converted to a binary image
and each pixel inside the watermark text is checked so the
coefficients are swapped if the size of each coefficient does
not agree with the bit that is to be encoded. Thus, if the
pixel value in the binary text is 1, the DCT coefficient are
swapped such that DCTu1,v1 > DCTu2,v2. On the other hand,
if the pixel value is 0, coefficients are swapped so that
DCTu2,v2 > DCTu1,v1.
Hence, instead of degrading the image by inserting data,
this scheme hides the watermark by interpreting 0 or 1 with
the relative values of the two fixed locations in the FM
region (DCTu1,v1 and DCTu2,v2). It is known that the DCT
coefficients of the middle frequencies generally have similar
magnitudes [31] so swapping of such coefficients will not
alter the watermarked image significantly.
During the watermark extraction, the 8 × 8 DCT of the
cover image is taken again, and the watermarking algorithm
will decode a 1 if DCTu1,v1 > DCTu2,v2; otherwise it will
decode a 0 to form the watermark.
Yet, if only one pair of coefficients is used to hide
the watermark data, it will become vulnerable to noise
and attacks. Therefore, the watermark can be destroyed by
image manipulations and compression (as we demonstrate
in Section V-A.5). In addition, an attacker can analyze some
watermarked copies of the same image to predict the loca-
tions of these coefficients as well as destroy them. To solve
these problems, we propose to exchange multiple coefficient
pairs by selecting random locations from the FM frequency
band for the embedding purpose. Exchanging more than one
pair will increase redundancy and make the scheme robust
against different attacks. In addition, the random selection
of the embedding locations in each DCT block makes it
almost impossible for the attacker to predict these locations
and destroy the watermarking information or embed false
information inside the watermarked image.
FIGURE 3. JPEG quantization table and the selected embedding locations.
Empirical results have shown that exchanging four pairs
from the middle frequency band gives a good trade-off
between robustness and perceptibility. Basically, any of the
22 middle band locations (FM ) shown in Fig 2 can be uti-
lized for the embedding purpose. Nevertheless, to make the
TABLE 1. The locations array (L) used for selecting the watermarking
embedding locations.
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Algorithm 1: Embedding Algorithm
Input: s1,L,W ,X
(s1: watermarking key, L: locations array, W :
watermarking text, X : host image)
Output: Y
(Y : watermarked image)
1: for i = 1→ size(W ) do
2: X8×8(i) = X ;
{subdivide the host image (X ) into blocks of 8× 8
pixel}
3: XDCT (i) = 2D-DCT (X8×8(i))
{Compute the 2D-DCT of each 8× 8 block of the
host image}
4: for each DCT block, generate 4 random numbers r
within the range of 1−8 based on the private key s1.
5: if W(i) = 0 then
6: for j = 1→ 4 do
7: p = r(j) {select one of the random locations}
8: exchange DCT coefficients to meet this
condition DCT (Lp,1) < DCT (Lp,2)
{Now adjust the four values such that their
difference becomes larger than the strenghth
constant s, thus:}
9: if DCT (Lp,1)− DCT (Lp,2) < s then
10: DCT (Lp,1) = DCT (Lp,1)+ s/2
11: DCT (Lp,2) = DCT (Lp,2)− s/2
12: end if
13: end for
14: else if W(i) = 1 then
15: for j = 1→ 4 do
16: p = r(j) {select one of the random locations}
17: exchange DCT coefficients to meet this
condition DCT (Lp,1) >= DCT (Lp,2)
{Now adjust the three values such that their
difference becomes larger than the strength
constant s, thus:}
18: if DCT (Lp,2)− DCT (Lp,1) < s then
19: DCT (Lp,2) = DCT (Lp,2)+ s/2
20: DCT (Lp,1) = DCT (Lp,1)− s/2
21: end if
22: end for
23: end if
24: Take inverse DCT to reconstruct Y
25: end for
algorithm robust against JPEG compression, eight embed-
ding pairs have been selected based on the recommended
JPEG quantization table. It can be seen from Fig. 3 that
these locations are suitable for embedding because they
have almost the same value in the JPEG quantization table.
Therefore, a scaling applied to any of these coefficients
will scale the other one with the same factor. This in turn
will preserve the relative size of the coefficients to be
exchanged.
Algorithm 2: Detection Algorithm
Input: s1,L,Y
(s1: watermarking key, L: locations array, Y :
watermarked image)
Output: W
(W : binary text)
1: for i = 1→ size(W ) do
2: for each DCT block, generate the same 4 random
numbers r within the range of 1− 8 based on the
private key s1.
3: Y8×8(i) = Y ;
{subdivide the cover image (Y ) into blocks of 8×8
pixels}
4: YDCT (i) = 2D-DCT (Y8×8(i))
{Compute the 2D-DCT of each 8× 8 block of the
cover image}
5: for j = 1→ 4 do
6: p = r(j) {select one of the random locations}
7: if DCTp,1 > DCTp,2 then
8: W (i) = 1
9: else
10: W (i) = 0
11: end if
12: end for
13: reconstruct the binary text image W from W(i)
14: end for
Thence, the location of the pairs to be exchanged will be
selected randomly from the shaded locations shown in Fig. 3
based on a private key s1 which is stored on a smart card
as illustrated later in Section IV-B1. This key (s1) is used as
an initial seed for the random number generators which will
generate the four digits vector r within the range of 1 to 8.
Hence, four new rows from the location array L shown in
Table 1 will be chosen for each 8×8 block of the cover image
based on the random numbers. For example, if r = [2 3 5 8]
this means that the 2nd , 3rd , 5th and 8th rows from the location
array L will be chosen and the corresponding pairs will be
used for the embedding purpose. So, when the 8th row from
the location array (L) is selected, this means that p = 8 and
DCT (Lp,1) is (2,6) and DCT (Lp,2) is (3,6) which correspond
to the values of 58 and 57 in Fig. 3, respectively.
Moreover, to improve the robustness of the watermarking
algorithm, we propose to add a watermark strength constant
s such that DCTu1,v1 − DCTu2,v2 > s. If coefficients do not
meet this criterion, a constant value will be added to satisfy
the relation.
1) EMBEDDING ALGORITHM
Each 8 × 8 block of image will be used to hide one bit
of watermark text. A binary text image (W ) is taken as a
watermarking object which can be interpreted as a 1-D array
of 1s and 0s. The watermark text image carries the person’s
bio-information such as name, ID and date of birth. The steps
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FIGURE 4. Block diagram of the proposed watermarking algorithm.
of the embedding algorithm are shown in Algorithm 1 while
the flow chart is depicted in Fig. 4.
2) THE STRENGTH OF WATERMARK
The robustness of the watermark has been increased by
choosing an appropriate value of the strength constant s.
Increasing s will degrade the image but it will reduce the
chance of errors during the detection phase. Experimental
results indicate that setting s equal to 15 is the most suitable
value in terms of perceptibility versus robustness. Therefore,
the experiments have been conducted by keeping s = 15 for
all the images.
3) DETECTION ALGORITHM
Watermark extraction is the reverse procedure of the water-
mark embedding algorithm. The embedding location will be
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FIGURE 5. The enrolment module of the proposed method using VC.
FIGURE 6. The authentication module of the proposed method using VC.
selected based on the private key (s1) which is either obtained
from the smart card or generated from the stored template
in the database (share1) with the help of a hash function
as demonstrated later in Section IV-B.1. The steps of the
detection algorithm are shown in Algorithm 2.
B. STAGE TWO: VISUAL CRYPTOGRAPHY
Attacks on the stored biometric template in a database are
considered as one of the most destructive attacks because
they lead to different vulnerabilities [32] such as gaining
an unauthorized access to the system by creating a physical
spoof from the template [6], [7], [33]. In addition, they allow
an unauthorized access to the system by the replication of the
stolen template to the matcher. Moreover, the stored template
could be replaced by an imposter. In this section, we propose a
novel template protection scheme in order to tackle the above
problems. Furthermore, to protect the integrity of the template
saved on the card or database, the SHA-2 hash function is
used. SHA-2 is a set of one way hash functions designed by
NSA [34] which generates a unique signature of a vector.
Therefore, the hash function is implemented to generate a
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FIGURE 7. Down sampling to retrieve the original template size.
unique signature of the template as will be discussed in the
next sub-section. The proposed template protection method
consists of two modules namely: (A) Enrolment module and
(B) Authentication module.
1) ENROLMENT MODULE
In this module, feature encoding is implemented by convolv-
ing the normalized iris template with a 1-D log-Gabor filter.
The output of filtering is then phase quantized to four levels
using the Daugman method [5], with each filter producing
two bits of data for each phase to form the binary template
(IrisCode).
Then, the binary template is decomposed into two shares
using (2,2) VC and the original template is discarded.
After that, two 256 bit signatures s1 and s2 are generated
as signatures for share1 and share2 respectively using the
SHA-256 hash function to maintain the integrity of the iris
template. In the enrolment stage, one of the decomposed
shares (share1) is stored in the database along with s2 (signa-
ture of share2) while share2 and s1 are given to the user on
a smart card. s1 is also used as the private key which selects
the watermarking embedding locations. The enrolment stage
is shown in Fig. 5.
2) AUTHENTICATION MODULE
During the authentication process, the system sends a request
to the database to fetch the corresponding (share1) based on
the generated signature (s2) from share2. Then, the obtained
share from the database is stacked together with the user’s
share from the smart card in order to reconstruct the original
iris template. Moreover, to make sure that the template in
the smart card or the database is not altered, the SHA-256
hash function is generated again and compared with the
stored signatures s1 and s2. If the signatures do not match,
authorization will not be granted. After that, the inbound
user’s iris template and the reconstructed iris template from
the smart card and the database are compared together to
authenticate the user. The authentication module is illustrated
in Fig. 6.
In order to restore the original template size after the expan-
sion by VC, the reconstructed template is down sampled by
selecting only one pixel from every 2 × 2 block as shown
in Fig. 7. Thus, the generated image will have the same size
of the original template and less storage and computational
requirements.
V. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND RESULTS
The proposed method has been tested on the CASIA V4
and the UBIRIS V1 databases. The CASIA V4 was released
by the Institute of Automation, Chinese Academy of Sci-
FIGURE 8. Perceptibility of the watermarked image; (a) original image,
(b) watermarked image, (c) the difference image, (d) original watermark,
(e) binarized text and (f) the extracted watermark.
ences [35]. It contains 16212 images from 819 classes. It was
collected in an indoor environment under the near-infrared
light. On the other hand, the UBIRIS V1 iris image database
was released by the University of Beira, Portugal [36]. It con-
tains 1877 images from 241 subjects in two different sessions.
All images are taken under visible light.
For the first stage, the iris images were watermarked with
the 64 × 64 pixel text image shown in Fig. 8 (d) after con-
verting it to a binary image. On the other hand, after feature
extraction, the generated template is decomposed with (2,2)
VC into two shares: one share is saved in the database and
the other is saved on a smart card with template on card
architecture as proposed in the previous work [37]. In the next
sub-sections, an analysis is presented for each stage of the
proposed scheme.
A. STAGE ONE: WATERMARKING
A good watermarking algorithm should meet different
requirements such as perceptibility, robustness to various
image manipulations and it should not degrade the matching
performance of the biometric system significantly. In order to
evaluate the proposed watermarkingmethod, a set of different
tests has been carried out as shown in the next sub-sections.
1) WATERMARK PERCEPTIBILITY
The similarity between the original and the watermarked
image (perceptibility) indicates the impact of the watermark-
ing algorithm on the cover image. Therefore, in a good
watermarking algorithm, the watermarking effect should be
imperceptible to the user. Fig. 8 (c) demonstrates that the
difference between the original and the watermarked iris
image is not noticeable to the naked eye without the help of
the image processing techniques.
To quantitatively evaluate the performance of the water-
marking algorithm, Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR) and
Bit Error Rate (BER) are calculated. The average PSNR
between the original iris and the watermarked iris is 38.47 and
the average BER is 0.22% while the average PSNR and BER
of the extracted watermarking text are 84.63 and 0.023%,
respectively.
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FIGURE 9. Effect of the proposed watermarking algorithm on the iris recognition performance: (a) UBIRIS V1 and (b) CASIA V4.
TABLE 2. BER and PSNR of the extracted watermark after different manipulations using different watermarking algorithms.
FIGURE 10. Effect of different manipulations on the iris recognition performance: (a) UBIRIS V1 and (b) CASIA V4.
2) EFFECT ON MATCHING PERFORMANCE
To investigate the effect of the proposed watermarking
algorithm on the iris recognition performance, Daugman’s
approach [5] for iris recognition has been implemented
with the segmentation algorithm proposed in our previous
work [38], then the Equal Error Rate (EER) is calculated for
the non-watermarked iris images. After that, the proposed
watermarking algorithm is applied on the same iris images
and the EER is calculated again. Fig. 9 illustrates the effect
of the proposed watermarking algorithm on iris recognition
performance in terms of the Receiver Operating Characteris-
tics (ROC) curve and EER. According to Fig. 9, the proposed
watermarking algorithm barely disturb the EER across both
UBIRISV1 andCASIAV4 databases. Consequently, the pro-
posed watermarking algorithm does not involve a noticeable
effect on the iris recognition performance.
3) PERFORMANCE AGAINST COMPRESSION AND NOISE
Other factors that may degrade the images were tested here
such as compression and noising. In fact, the compression
of large images becomes inevitable when transmitting such
images over low bandwidth channels. On the other hand,
there is an increased susceptibility to image degradation due
to the noise in such channels.
To simulate these factors, the image compression algo-
rithm, Joint Photograph Expert Group (JPEG) has been
applied with different quality factors (Q) on the watermarked
iris images. In addition, we applied additive zero mean white
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FIGURE 11. Effects of various attacks on the extracted watermark using
different watermarking algorithms.
Gaussian noise (AWGN) to the watermarked iris images
with zero mean and variance equal to 10−3. Table 2 clearly
indicates that the extracted text is still discernible even after
adding a Gaussian noise or applying JPEG compression with
different quality factors.
4) PERFORMANCE AGAINST IMAGE
MANIPULATIONS AND ATTACKS
The proposed watermarking algorithmwas tested against var-
ious number of imagemanipulations such as median filtering,
histogram equalization, compression, cropping and noising.
In addition, the BER and PSNR of the extracted text were
calculated for each type of manipulation as shown in Table 2.
In addition, the recognition performances of the water-
marked iris images are compared with the manipulated iris
images in terms of ROC curves and EER as shown in Fig. 10.
The slight degradation in the recognition performance in
these cases is due to the added noise factors and not due to
the watermarking algorithm.
5) COMPARISON WITH OTHER WATERMARKING METHODS
In order to appreciate the efficiency of the proposed method,
different image watermarking methods such as LSB [39],
Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) [40] and DWT
with Pseudo Noise (DWT-PN) [41], [42] are implemented
and compared with our method and the same manipulations
are applied to the watermarked iris images. Moreover, the
proposed watermarking scheme is implemented with differ-
ent strength constants as shown in Fig. 11 which depicts
the extracted watermark after various manipulations using
different watermarking methods.
As expected the LSB technique could not tolerate most of
the attacks and the watermarked image is destroyed; whereas,
CDMAandDWT-PN perform slightly better than LSB by tol-
erating JPEG compression, however, they failed to overtake
several types of manipulations. On the other hand, exchang-
ing only one pair of DCT coefficients failed to withstand
all attacks because the coefficient can be easily destroyed
by noise. It is noticed that there is a prominent improve-
ment in the performance of the watermarking algorithm after
adding the proposed strength constant but it is still vulnerable
to median filtering and compression. On the contrary, the
proposed algorithm which randomly exchanges four pairs
with a strength constant (s = 15) sustained all the above
imagemanipulations and demonstrated that thewatermarking
scheme is resistant to different types of attacks.
B. STAGE TWO: VISUAL CRYPTOGRAPHY
The proposed scheme achieves the template protection
requirements namely: revocability, diversity, security and
performance maintenance [32], [43]. Firstly, in terms of
revocability, whenever the iris template stored in the smart
card/database is compromised, a new iris template can be
generated and decomposed into new shares. Nevertheless,
to boost the security, this operation is recommended to be
carried out at regular intervals. Secondly, as for diversity,
the shares appear as random noise, therefore, it is hard
to match them across the database as demonstrated later
in Section V-B.3. Thirdly, the iris template is secured after
the VC because the iris template can only be generated if
both shares are available simultaneously. Therefore, even if
the smart card is lost or stolen, the attacker will not be able
to generate the iris template. Fourthly, the performance of the
biometric system is not affected by the proposed scheme as
using the original template or the generated template from
VC gave the same EER in both cases.
In the next sub-sections, we carry out different statistical
tests in order to check for randomness in the encrypted tem-
plate and check its ability to confront the statistical attacks.
1) ADJACENT PIXELS CORRELATION
To test the randomness of the generated shares after VC, the
correlation coefficient [44] of the adjacent pixels is tested.
In a random image, the adjacent pixels should have little
correlation amongst them.
TABLE 3. Adjacent pixel correlation coefficient.
Table 3 lists the averages of the horizontal, vertical and
diagonal correlation coefficients of the adjacent pixels for the
template, share1 and share2 respectively. It can be seen from
Table 3 that there is a very little correlation among the pixels
of the shares while the original template pixels have a high
correlation.
2) PIXEL DISTRIBUTION TEST
This test is used to check the distribution of the pixels in the
resulting share. A random vector should have almost a uni-
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form distribution of zeros and ones. To check the distribution,
the number of pixels in each row of the original templates
is counted and plotted, then it compared with the encrypted
shares before down-sampling. Fig. 12 shows that the pixels
of the encrypted share are uniformly distributed across all the
columns which confirms the random nature of the resultant
shares.
FIGURE 12. Pixels distribution: (a) the original iris template and (b) the
encrypted share.
3) SHARE TO TEMPLATE MATCHING
In this test, the possibility of share matching against a tem-
plate is investigated. The procedure consists of matching a
probe against thewhole gallery in the database. The shares are
used after down sampling as probes and the original templates
are used as a gallery. The result in terms of EER is equal to
47%which clearly indicates that it is not possible to authorize
a person with either of the shares. On the other hand, using the
original template or the generated template from VC gave the
same EER in both cases. These results clearly indicate that
the iris recognition performance is not affected when using
the proposed VC scheme.
4) UNLINKABILITY OF PROTECTED SHARES
Unlinkability means that protected templates should not
allow cross-matching so that protected templates gener-
ated from a single object should differ from each other
(diversity) [18]. The unlinkability of the shares is tested by
matching a probe against the whole gallery in the database.
The shares are used as a gallery and each share is used as
a probe to perform cross-matching. This resulted in EER
equals to 48.5% which clearly indicates the unlinkability of
the shares.
C. COMPUTATION TIME
All experiments were conducted on a 3.2 GHz core i5 PCwith
8 GB of RAM under the Matlab environment. The proposed
method can be divided into two stages namely: watermarking
and VC.
The proposedwatermarking algorithm is based on theDCT
which is widely used in real time devices. This is because
the DCT can be implemented easily as it is based on real
cosine basis functions that are easy to compute and imple-
ment [49]. Although the direct application of these formulas
would require O(N 2) operations, the same formula can be
implemented with only O(NlogN ) complexity by factorizing
the computation with a similar approach to the fast Fourier
transform [50]. On the other hand, the VC scheme proposed
in this paper utilizes the logical XOR operator which is
mapped to a single-cycle operation on modern processors.
Therefore, the overall complexity of the proposed approach
can be approximated to [O(NlogN ) + O(N )] which can be
approximated to O(NlogN ) for large values of N .
TABLE 4. The average computation times (in sec) of each stage in the
proposed algorithm.
Table 4 shows the average computation time for each stage
of the proposed method in each database. The variations in
the computation times among databases in the watermarking
stage are due to the different images size. The proposed
method takes less than a second to be executed which implies
that it is suitable for real time and practical in many appli-
cations. Although the reported computational time of the
proposed scheme is short, this time can be drastically reduced
with code optimization and porting to a compiled language
since there are no involved computations.
D. COMPARISONS WITH STATE-OF-THE-ART METHODS
In order to achieve a fair comparison, each protection layer
in the proposed protection scheme is considered individually.
In terms of watermarking, comparison with the same sce-
nario is difficult because most of the papers in the literature
focus on protecting the biometric data with watermarking
by embedding such data in a cover signal [10], [11], [45].
However, a few focus on protecting the biometric image
itself [12]. Table 5 lists the few available state-of-the-art bio-
metric watermarking methods. The work of [10] adopted the
DWT and SVD to embed the iris feature inside an arbitrary
cover image. However, the watermarked image and a key
are required during the watermarking extraction stage [10].
Similarly, the work of [45] exploited the DWT and SVD to
embed the fingerprint feature inside a face image. However,
this method requires a shuffling key to encrypt the water-
marked image and the performance of this method is affected
by noise [45]. In addition, the aforementioned methods used
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TABLE 5. Comparisons with state-of-the-art biometric watermarking methods.
TABLE 6. Comparisons with state-of-the-art iris template protection methods.
the SVD which has a complexity of O(N 2) in its best imple-
mentation [51]. In the work of [11], a watermarking algorithm
is proposed to embed the fingerprint and iris feature in the low
frequency coefficients of the DCT blocks of a cover image.
The cover image is then divided into smooth and edge blocks
where the latter are eliminated. Unfortunately, embedding the
watermark in the low frequency AC coefficients is vulnerable
to attacks [27]. In addition, removing the edge blocks will
degrade the watermarked image. In our previous work, we
proposed to protect the iris images based on interchanging
fixed locations of the DCT middle band coefficients [12].
However, there is a possibility that an attacker can predict
these fixed locations and destroy the watermark information
or embed false watermark data.
In terms of template protection, as mentioned before,
few papers address biometric template protection with VC.
Since the same scenario is not available, we compare our
proposed VC method with the similar template protection
scenarios proposed in [15], [17], and [46] as shown in Table 6.
A method is proposed in [15] for preserving the privacy of
the iris template. This method involves some performance
degradation as well as complex operations to generate the
BioCapsul and requires keys to be extracted from the user’s
signal. Next, an alternative method is proposed in [17] to
protect the binary iris template based on bloom filters. How-
ever, Hermans et al. [18] demonstrate that the work of [17]
is vulnerable to cross-shares matching and the reversibility is
possible for a nonuniform randomly generated template. On
the other hand, the cancelable biometric approach is proposed
for iris template protection in [46]. Yet, the work of [47]
demonstrated that there are several drawbacks of using the
cancelable biometrics such as reversibility and venerability
to spoofing and coalition attacks.
In this paper, all the previous drawbacks have been
addressed since the proposed watermarking approach is
robust against noise and considered as a ‘‘blind watermark-
ing technique’’ as it does not require the original image for
extracting the embedded watermark. In addition, the pro-
posed watermarking method makes no restrictive hypothesis
on the biometric image and hence it is applicable to multi-
ple biometrics traits. On the other hand, our proposed VC
scheme does not involve any effect on the iris recognition
performance and does not require any key for the decryption.
Moreover, integrating the hash function with the smart card
will maintain the integrity of the stored data and offers robust-
ness against data modification attempts in either the smart
card or the database.
E. APPLICABILITY AND LIMITATIONS
The proposed scheme is designed to effectively protect the
image and template of the iris biometric. One of the main
advantages of our proposed watermarking scheme is that it
can be readily applied to any type of images other than the
iris images. Yet, the type of the embedded data should be
binary data such as a binary image or an ASCII code. Since
one bit can be hidden in each image block, the maximum size
of the embedded data is equal to (height × width)/blocksize.
For example, for a block size of 8, if an image resolution
is 800 × 600, the maximum watermark size will be
7500 bits.
On the other hand, the proposed VC scheme is
capable of working with binary template or data. This type
of biometric template is widely used in feature represen-
tation of various biometric traits such as iris, face and
fingerprint [5], [52], [53].
The stored template in the database has almost the same
size of the conventional IrisCode with only 256 additional
bits for the hash function. In addition, the watermarked iris
image has a similar size to the original iris image. This makes
it analogous to available iris recognition systems in terms of
database handling.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
The work proposed in this paper aimed to bring insight into
the problem of biometric security. Novel schemes were pro-
posed for iris image and template protection which consist of
two security layers. The first layer is a robust watermarking
algorithm which was implemented to protect the integrity of
the biometric image. In particular, a binary text image that
accommodates the bio data of the person to be authenticated
was embedded in the iris image by randomly interchanging
four pairs of the DCT middle band coefficients. The embed-
ding locations were randomly selected based on a private key.
Moreover, the proposed strength constant s was included to
add more robustness to the watermarking algorithm.
The second layer involved using the VC to protect the iris
template by decomposing the original iris template into two
shares using (2,2) VC where one share is given to the user
on a smart card while the other is stored in a database. The
proposed VC scheme allows the iris template to be perfectly
restored with the same quality and size when the shares are
available, and therefore it does not hinder the iris recogni-
tion performance. To this end, an extra layer of security is
provided to the iris template because even if either of the
shares in the database or the smart card is compromised, the
original template cannot be retrieved. Further, the integrity of
the iris templates, in both the smart card and the database, is
also guaranteed with the use of the hash signatures. The gen-
erated signature from the hash function is not only beneficial
to maintain the integrity of the smart card but also it has been
used to select the embedding locations for the watermarking
algorithm.
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